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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Martin H. Escobar,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Jan Brewer, Governor of the State of
Arizona, in her Official and Individual
Capacity; City of Tucson, a municipal
corporation,
Defendants.

No. CV 10-249-PHX-SRB

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Janice K. Brewer’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“Def.’s Mot.”) (Doc. 55).

I. BACKGROUND

The Arizona Legislature enacted a set of statutes and statutory amendments in the form of Senate Bill 1070, the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” 2010 Arizona Session Laws, Chapter 113, which Governor Brewer signed into law on April 23, 2010. Seven days later, the Governor signed into law a set of amendments to Senate Bill 1070 under House Bill 2162, 2010 Arizona Session Laws, Chapter 211.¹ S.B. 1070 had an effective date of July 29, 2010. Among other things, S.B. 1070 Subsection 2(B) requires

¹ In this Order, unless otherwise specified, the Court refers to S.B. 1070 and H.B. 2162 collectively as “S.B. 1070,” describing the April 23, 2010, enactment as modified by the April 30, 2010, amendments.

1 officers to make a reasonable attempt, when practicable, to determine an individual's
2 immigration status during any lawful stop, detention, or arrest where reasonable suspicion
3 exists that the person is unlawfully present in the United States. S.B. 1070 § 2(B) (adding
4 Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 11-1051(B)). In addition, Subsection 2(A) prohibits Arizona
5 officials, agencies and political subdivisions from limiting or restricting the enforcement of
6 federal immigration laws, and Subsection 2(H) permits legal residents of Arizona to bring
7 civil actions challenging "any official or agency of [Arizona] that adopts or implements a
8 policy that limits or restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws . . . to less than the
9 full extent permitted by federal law." *Id.* § 11-1051(A), (H). Section 6 of S.B. 1070 amends
10 A.R.S. § 13-3883 to permit an officer to arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has
11 probable cause to believe that "the person to be arrested has committed any public offense
12 that makes the person removable from the United States." *Id.* § 13-3883(A)(5).

13 Plaintiff Martin Escobar is a police officer with the City of Tucson Police Department
14 holding the rank of Lead Patrol Officer. (Doc. 4, 1st Am. Compl. ("FAC") ¶ 10.) Plaintiff
15 challenges provisions found in Sections 2 and 6 of S.B. 1070. Plaintiff alleges that as a police
16 officer he is obligated to enforce S.B. 1070 and that he "believes the Act . . . is unlawful
17 [and] results in impermissible deprivations of rights guaranteed by the United States
18 Constitution." (*Id.* ¶¶ 21, 57.) Plaintiff asserts that enforcement of S.B. 1070 will violate the
19 rights of Latinos and Latinas as well as minors and school children and that he may be
20 subject to civil liability for violating the rights of others in enforcing S.B. 1070. (*Id.* ¶¶ 69-70,
21 77.) Plaintiff also alleges that, if he refuses to enforce S.B. 1070, he will be subject to
22 discipline by his employer and civil actions brought pursuant to Subsection 2(H) of S.B.
23 1070. (*Id.* ¶¶ 71-72.) According to Plaintiff's FAC, Plaintiff will also be "forced to expend
24 his scarce time and resources in order to thoroughly familiarize himself with [S.B. 1070]'s
25 requirements." (*Id.* ¶ 73.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he is being pressured to enforce S.B.
26 1070 by "individuals within the Tucson Police Department" and that this pressure is chilling
27 his First Amendment right to speak out against S.B. 1070. (*Id.* ¶¶ 74-75.)

28 Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on April 29, 2010, after S.B. 1070 was signed but

1 before it was modified by H.B. 2162. (*See* Doc. 1, Compl.) Plaintiff filed his FAC on May
2 18, 2010. (*See* FAC.) Defendant Brewer challenges Plaintiff’s standing to pursue his
3 challenges to S.B. 1070 and argues that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
4 can be granted. (Def.’s Mot. at 1.)

5 **II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS**

6 **A. Dismissal for Lack of Standing Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)**

7 Defendant Brewer moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
8 Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring this action. (*Id.* at
9 4-9.) “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
10 decide the merits of the dispute” *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (citation
11 omitted). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing standing and must “‘allege[] such a
12 personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant [the] invocation of
13 federal-court jurisdiction and . . . justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers.” *Id.* at 499
14 (quoting *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). In evaluating standing, courts must accept
15 all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in favor of the
16 plaintiff. *Graham v. FEMA*, 149 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Warth*, 422 U.S. at
17 501).

18 Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff does not have standing unless he can
19 show (1) an “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent (not
20 conjectural or hypothetical); (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of
21 the defendant; and (3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
22 be redressed by a favorable decision. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
23 (1992); *see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst.*, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009). Even when the
24 constitutional minima of standing are present, prudential concerns may impose additional
25 limitations. *Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow*, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004). Prudential
26 standing limitations embody “‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
27 jurisdiction.’” *Id.* at 12 (quoting *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). Prudential
28 standing limitations include “‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s

1 legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
2 addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall
3 within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” *Id.* (quoting *Allen*, 468 U.S. at
4 750); *see also Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman*, 504 F.3d 840, 848-49
5 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Johnson v. Stuart*, 702 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1983)).

6 **B. Plaintiff's Standing to Challenge S.B. 1070**

7 Plaintiff's FAC alleges several injuries arising from Plaintiff's obligation to enforce
8 S.B. 1070. (FAC ¶¶ 69-77.) In addition, Plaintiff argues in his Response to Defendant's
9 Motion to Dismiss that he has standing “[a]s a Hispanic residing in Arizona . . . exposed to
10 all the dangers that [S.B. 1070] presents” and as a result of his pending Motions to
11 Consolidate. (Pl.'s Resp. at 12, 16.) Defendant Brewer challenges each alleged injury as an
12 insufficient basis for standing under both the constitutional and prudential standing
13 limitations. (Def.'s Mot. at 5-9.)

14 **1. Standing Based on Plaintiff's Alleged Injuries as a Law Enforcement Officer**

15 Plaintiff alleges that, as a law enforcement officer obligated to enforce S.B. 1070, he
16 is faced with “a dilemma.” (FAC ¶ 77.) Plaintiff alleges that “if he refuses to enforce [S.B.
17 1070], he can be disciplined by his employer or subjected to costly private enforcement
18 actions under [S.B. 1070]” and that, “if he enforces [S.B. 1070], he can be subjected to costly
19 civil actions alleging the deprivation of the civil rights of the individual against whom he
20 enforces [S.B. 1070].” (*Id.*)

21 As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar dilemma
22 in *City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency* and ultimately
23 determined that the dilemma did not give rise to standing. 625 F.2d 231, 237-238 (9th Cir.
24 1980). In *City of South Lake Tahoe*, city councilmembers challenged planning and
25 development regulations. *Id.* at 233. The councilmembers asserted that, while they were
26 required by law to enforce the challenged regulations and a refusal to enforce the regulations
27 could result in criminal penalties, enforcement of the regulations would violate the
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1 councilmembers' oaths of office to uphold the United States Constitution and would expose
2 the councilmembers to civil liability. *Id.* The court recognized the councilmembers'
3 "personal dilemma" but noted that "the source of the . . . complaint . . . [was] just abstract
4 outrage at the enactment of an unconstitutional law" and that "the councilmembers will lose
5 nothing by enforcing the [challenged legislation] save an abstract measure of constitutional
6 principle." *Id.* at 237. The court concluded that, because the councilmembers could act to
7 enforce the regulations without any real threat of concrete harm, "the councilmembers ha[d]
8 available a course of action which subjects them to no concrete adverse consequences." *Id.*
9 Ultimately, the court held that the abstract injuries were insufficient to support standing. *Id.*

10 Plaintiff's alleged dilemma similarly fails to provide a sufficient basis for standing.
11 Plaintiff asserts that enforcement of S.B. 1070 will subject him to costly civil actions. (FAC
12 ¶ 77.) However, standing requires the plaintiff to allege that he "has sustained or is
13 immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury." *City of S. Lake Tahoe*, 625 F.2d at
14 238. The *City of South Lake Tahoe* court found that the plaintiffs' allegations that they would
15 be exposed to civil liability if they acted to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional regulations
16 were "wholly speculative." *Id.* In addition, the court noted that "multiple contingencies"
17 preclude standing where "there is no immediate threat of suit nor reason to believe suit is
18 inevitable." *Id.* at 239. Here, not only is the threat of potential suit wholly speculative, but
19 it is also not clear that Plaintiff would be civilly liable for actions taken in enforcing S.B.
20 1070. Generally, law enforcement officers are not liable for actions committed "insofar as
21 their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
22 a reasonable person would have known." *Pearson v. Callahan*, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009)
23 (quoting *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); *see also Grossman v. City of*
24 *Portland*, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that "an officer who reasonably
25 relies on the legislature's determination that a statute is constitutional should be shielded
26 from personal liability"). In addition, S.B. 1070 § 2(K) provides:

27 Except in relation to matters in which the officer is adjudged to have acted in
28 bad faith, a law enforcement officer is indemnified by the law enforcement
officer's agency against reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney

1 fees, incurred by the officer in connection with any action, suit or proceeding
2 brought pursuant to this section in which the officer may be a defendant by
3 reason of the officer being or having been a member of the law enforcement
4 agency.

5 S.B. 1070 § 2(K) (adding A.R.S. § 11-1051(K)). In light of these limits on officer liability,
6 “the threat of civil liability is too attenuated and conjectural” to provide Plaintiff with a basis
7 for standing. *See City of S. Lake Tahoe*, 625 F.2d at 239.

8 Plaintiff also asserts that if he refuses to enforce S.B. 1070 he will be subject to
9 discipline by his employer and “costly lawsuits by private parties” pursuant to the
10 enforcement provision found in Subsection 2(H) of S.B. 1070. (FAC ¶¶ 71-72.) Subsection
11 2(H) provides:

12 A person who is a legal resident of this state may bring an action in superior
13 court to challenge any official or agency of this state or a . . . political
14 subdivision of this state that adopts or implements a policy that limits or
15 restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws . . . [and that] [i]f there
16 is a judicial finding that an *entity* has violated this section, the court shall order
17 that the *entity* pay a civil penalty.

18 S.B.1070 § 2(H) (adding A.R.S. § 11-1051(H)) (emphasis added). On its face, Subsection
19 2(H) does not appear to impose liability on individual law enforcement officers. As a result,
20 Plaintiff’s allegation that he will be subject to private actions brought pursuant to Subsection
21 2(H) of S.B. 1070 fails to give rise to a “concrete and particularized” injury sufficient to
22 support Plaintiff’s standing. *See Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560. In addition, the allegation that
23 Plaintiff will be subject to discipline by his employer if he refuses to enforce S.B. 1070 also
24 fails because the threat of discipline is too abstract and speculative. “A party facing
25 prospective injury has standing to sue where the threatened injury is real, immediate, and
26 direct.” *Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n*, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2769 (2008) (citing *City of L.A. v.*
27 *Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); *Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union*, 442 U.S. 289,
28 298 (1979)). While Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Brewer and the City of Tucson have
expressed an intent to enforce the law, this does not provide any information about the
likelihood that Plaintiff will be subject to discipline for a refusal to enforce the law. (*See*
FAC ¶ 55.) Plaintiff has not alleged any facts making the alleged injury resulting from
discipline for a failure to enforce S.B. 1070 imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical.

1 Moreover, the fact “[t]hat an alternative course exists [(i.e. refusing to enforce the statute)]
2 which might result in criminal liability does not transform the [plaintiffs’] abstract
3 disagreement with the legislature . . . into [a] judicially cognizable concrete injury.” *City of*
4 *S. Lake Tahoe*, 625 F.2d at 237-38. Here, the fact that Plaintiff might be subject to discipline
5 for refusing to perform his obligations as a law enforcement officer does not transform his
6 “abstract disagreement” with S.B. 1070 into a “judicially cognizable concrete injury.” *See*
7 *id.*

8 Plaintiff also alleges that “he does not believe that he can enforce [S.B. 1070] because
9 he believes that in so doing” he would violate the rights of Latinos and Latinas as well as
10 minors and school children. (FAC ¶¶ 69-70.) A “plaintiff generally must assert his own legal
11 rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third
12 parties.” *Warth*, 422 U.S. at 499; *see also City of S. Lake Tahoe*, 625 F.2d at 239 n.8 (noting
13 that city councilmembers could not raise constitutional rights of third parties where the
14 councilmembers’ injuries were abstract rather than not concrete and particularized). Here,
15 the injury alleged is actually an injury to the constitutional rights of others. (*See* FAC ¶¶ 69-
16 70.) Plaintiff cannot meet the standing requirements by asserting an injury based on
17 violations of the rights of others. *See Warth*, 422 U.S. at 499.²

18 In addition, Plaintiff alleges that he “will be forced to expend his scarce time and
19 resources in order to fully familiarize himself with [S.B. 1070].” (FAC ¶ 73.) It is not clear
20 how Plaintiff will be harmed by learning about S.B. 1070 or how learning about S.B. 1070
21 would be any different from Plaintiff’s regular work duties. The allegation that Plaintiff, a
22 law enforcement officer, will have to spend time to learn about and understand the
23 enforcement of a new law is simply insufficient to state an injury for purposes of standing.

24 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he is being pressured to enforce S.B. 1070 by
25 “individuals within the Tucson Police Department and . . . various political entities” and that

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27 ² To the extent Plaintiff alleges an injury to his own rights based on the obligation to
28 violate the rights of others, Plaintiff’s injury is the type of “abstract constitutional
grievance[.]” rejected as a basis for standing in *City of South Lake Tahoe*. 625 F.2d at 238.

1 this pressure is chilling his First Amendment right to speak out against S.B. 1070. (*Id.* ¶¶
2 74-75.) In order to give rise to standing, an “injury has to be ‘fairly ... trace[able] to the
3 challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
4 third party not before the court.’” *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560. The alleged chilling of Plaintiff’s
5 First Amendment rights results not from S.B. 1070 itself but from the alleged pressure to
6 enforce S.B. 1070 exerted on Plaintiff by unidentified third parties. (*See* FAC ¶¶ 74-75.) As
7 a result, the alleged injury to Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights is insufficient to act as a
8 basis for Plaintiff’s standing.

9 Plaintiff’s FAC fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that Plaintiff has standing
10 to bring this action.

11 **2. Standing Based on Plaintiff’s Alleged Injuries as a “Hispanic 12 Residing in Arizona”**

13 A plaintiff must allege facts in the complaint demonstrating the plaintiff’s standing.
14 *Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control*, 466 F.3d 764, 771 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing *Warren*
15 *v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc.*, 328 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003)); *see also City of S. Lake*
16 *Tahoe*, 625 F.2d at 237 n.7 (“[T]he facts [that] demonstrate a plaintiff’s standing must be
17 alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint.” (citing *Jenkins v. McKeithen*, 395 U.S. 411, 422 (1969))).
18 Plaintiff’s FAC does not include any allegations indicating that Plaintiff’s claims are based
19 on his status as a “Hispanic residing in Arizona.” Plaintiff cannot establish standing by
20 asserting a new theory of injury in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss. *See Sacks*, 466
21 F.3d at 771; *City of S. Lake Tahoe*, 625 F.2d at 237 n.7.

22 **3. Standing Based on Plaintiff’s Motions to Consolidate**

23 Plaintiff argues that “so long as one plaintiff has standing, the [standing] requirement
24 is satisfied.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 16 (citing *Constr. Indus. Ass’n of Sonoma Cnty. v. City of*
25 *Petaluma*, 522 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1975).) Plaintiff asserts that, since he has filed
26 Motions to Consolidate, “this Court should consider the issue of standing as consolidated
27 cases.” (*Id.* at 16-17.) Standing is a threshold question, and the instant litigation has not been
28 consolidated with any other pending suit. *See Farrakhan v. Gregoire*, 590 F.3d 989, 1001

1 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that standing is a threshold question designed to ensure “that the
2 plaintiff is the correct party to bring suit”).³ Plaintiff cites no law for the proposition that the
3 Court should evaluate his standing in light of pending motions to consolidate. Plaintiff’s
4 pending Motions to Consolidate do not alter the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s standing.

5 **III. CONCLUSION**


6 Plaintiff has not alleged “non-conclusory ‘factual content,’” from which the Court can
7 draw reasonable inferences that are “plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to
8 relief.” *Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.*, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Ashcroft v.*
9 *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009)). Therefore, and for the reasons stated above, the Court
10 finds that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring this lawsuit at this time.

11 **IT IS ORDERED** granting Defendant Janice K. Brewer’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
12 55). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is dismissed for lack of standing.

13 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** denying Plaintiff’s First Motion to Consolidate (Doc.
14 20), Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Consolidate (Doc. 79), and Plaintiff’s Motion for
15 Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 71).

16 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** directing Defendant City of Tucson to show cause,
17 within 14 days from the date of this Order, why the entire action, including the City of
18 Tucson’s Crossclaim (Doc. 9), should not be dismissed.

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20 DATED this 31st day of August, 2010.

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23 
24 Susan R. Bolton
United States District Judge

25
26 ³ In addition, consolidation is a discretionary determination based on a weighing of
27 the “judicial convenience against the potential for delay, confusion and prejudice caused by
28 consolidation.” *Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc.*, 720 F. Supp. 805, 807 (N.D.
Cal. 1989). Consolidation of cases where there is no standing does not promote judicial
efficiency.